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Federal Income Taxation
by Robert Beard*
and Gregory S. Lucas"
In 2016, federal courts in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit handed down several notable opinions on federal tax
issues. This Article surveys four of those opinions involving the collection
of foreign taxes pursuant to a tax treaty, the characterization of income
from the sale of real estate as capital gains, and self-employment taxes
on deferred compensation.'
I. Boree v. Commissioner
The Internal Revenue Code (Code)2 provides for different rates of individual income tax for ordinary income earned through business activities and long-term capital gain income. Capital gain is "[i]ncome representing proceeds from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. . . ."3
"Capital asset" is not directly defined in the Code, but does not include
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."4 Thus, when a taxpayer disposes
of some property that has been held for more than a year, the question
arises as to whether that property was held for sale as part of the taxpayer's business, or was instead purchased as an investment. In the Eleventh Circuit, determining whether an asset is a capital asset requires
*Senior Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A., 2004); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2007); University of Florida
Frederic G. Levin College of Law (LL.M., 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
-Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B., 2000); University of Chicago (M.A., 2004); University of Chicago (J.D., 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of federal taxation cases decided during the prior survey period,
see Robert Beard & Gregory S. Lucas, FederalIncome Taxation, Eleventh Circuit Survey,
67 MERCER L. REV. 929 (2016).
2. I.R.C. § 41 (2012). Unless otherwise indicated, all "section" references are to the
Code, as amended.
3. Long v. Commissioner, 772 F.3d 670, 675 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curium).
4. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)).
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consideration of seven factors set out in the old United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Winthrop.5 These
factors include the following:
(1) The nature and purpose of the acquisition of the property and the
duration of the ownership; (2) the extent and nature of the taxpayer's
efforts to sell the property; (3) the number, extent, continuity and substantiality of the sales; (4) the extent of subdividing, developing, and
advertising to increase sales; (5) the use of a business office for the sale
of the property; (6) the character and degree of supervision or control
exercised by the taxpayer over any representative selling the property;
and (7) the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted to the
sales.6
Although the third Winthrop factor is the "most important,"7 no one factor is determinative. 8 This makes the determination of whether an asset
is a capital asset necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry.9
Due to the more favorable tax rates applicable to long-term capital
gain, individual taxpayers generally will prefer to characterize income as
long-term capital gain rather than ordinary income. Because of the
highly fact-specific nature of the determination, it is often difficult for a
taxpayer to predict if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will accept the
taxpayer's characterization. The Eleventh Circuit addressed one such
failed attempt to characterize the sale of real estate as the sale of a capital asset in Boree v. Commissioner.10
This case originated in a 2002 purchase of 1,892 acres of vacant land
located in Baker County, Florida by Glen Forest, LLC (Glen Forest), a
tax partnership of Gregory Boree (Boree) and Daniel Dukes (Dukes)."
The purchase price was approximately $3.2 million and was substantially debt-financed. Within a month of the initial purchase, Glen Forest
began making occasional sales of portions of the land. 12
In 2003, Glen Forest submitted a residential development plan for the
property to the Baker County Planning and Zoning Department. The
planned residential development of the property would be called West
5. 417 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1969). Decisions handed down by the Fifth Circuit prior to
October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
6. Winthrop, 417 F.2d at 910.
7. Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
8. Id. at 415.
9. Id.
10. 837 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2016).
11. Id. at 1095.
12. Id. at 1096.

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

2017]1

1043

Glen Estates, and would contain more than 100 lots, which Glen Forest
would develop and sell in stages. Baker County accepted the proposal and
rezoned the property, and also granted Glen Forest's request for an exemption from county requirements that Glen Forest complete interior
roads prior to selling lots. Soon after, Glen Forest created a homeowners'
association for West Glen Estates. 13 The association documents referred
to Glen Forest as the "developer" and gave it authority to appoint at least
one member to the association's board so long as Glen Forest "holds for
sale in the ordinary course of business at least five percent (5%) of the
acreage in all phases of the property." 14 The documents made no distinctions among the lots that made up West Glen Estates. 15
After gaining the initial approvals from Baker County and forming the
homeowners' association, Glen Forest continued with its efforts to develop West Glen Estates. It applied for environmental permits, created
easements for water and utilities, and constructed an unpaved road. Glen
Forest did not, however, maintain a sales office or hire a broker to sell
lots, although it did place occasional classified advertisements for West
Glen Estates in local newspapers. Through these efforts, Glen Forest sold
approximately twenty-six lots in 2004.16
Development and selling slowed after a series of land use restrictions
were adopted by Baker County in late 2004. These restrictions included
moratoria on development along certain roads adjacent to West Glen Estates and on the development of subdivisions containing unpaved roads.
It later required that internal subdivision roads be paved, a restriction
from which Glen Forest sought, but failed to secure, an exemption. Boree
estimated that complying with the paving requirement would cost approximately $7 million. Perhaps because of these new restrictions, Glen
Forest sold only eight lots in 2005. Dukes also sold his interest in Glen
Forest to Boree in 2005, and Boree's wife replaced Dukes as Glen Forest's
second member.17
Faced with the new restrictions, Glen Forest attempted to get Baker
County to approve higher-density development in order to help cover the
costs of paving the roads. The new development plan would include a
commercial zone and a recreational parcel for equestrian and other activities. Although Glen Forest won approval for this plan, Baker County

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1096-97.
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also adopted, in early 2006, a requirement that roads leading to subdivisions be paved, which would cost Glen Forest an estimated $4.4 million.
Glen Forest sold no lots in 2006.18
Faced with the new paving requirement, Glen Forest turned to a developer, Adrian Development (Adrian), that was planning a development
adjacent to West Glen Estates, in an attempt to sell West Glen Estates.
An agreement was reached under which Adrian would purchase almost
all of the remaining property (over 1,067 acres) for at least $9,000 per
acre. The transaction closed in early 2007, and included property in various stages of development.19
The Borees' tax returns had been prepared by the same accounting
firm since 1998. Glen Forest's Schedules K-1 for the years 2002 to 2004
reported ordinary losses from the sale of West Glen Estates lots. For the
years 2005 to 2007, the costs incurred for the West Glen Estates property
were deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses. As those
costs exceeded the Borees' business income, they also claimed ordinary
losses in those years. The reporting of these gains, expenses, and losses
as ordinary is consistent with the Borees being engaged in the business
of developing real estate. However, the gain from the sale of the West
Glen Estates property in 2007 was reported as long-term capital gain,
rather than as ordinary gain. 20 That is consistent with the Borees being
real estate investors, rather than developers.
In 2011, the IRS issued the Borees a deficiency notice relating to the
characterization of the West Glen Estates income as long-term capital
gains rather than ordinary income. 21 The IRS determined that the income from the sale should have been reported as ordinary income. 22 The
IRS also imposed a 20% understatement of income tax penalty on the
resulting underpayment. 23 The Borees challenged the deficiency notice
and penalty in the Tax Court. 24
At trial, the Borees contended that West Glen Estates was intended to
be held as an investment, and that the sales were made only to service
the debt incurred in the original purchase of the land. The Tax Court,
however, noted that the evidence contradicted that testimony, and instead supported the IRS's position that the Borees purchased the property to develop in the ordinary course of business. Specifically, the Tax

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

1097.
1097-98.
1098-99.
1099.
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Court noted that the Borees engaged in business activities that included
the following: (1) subdividing the property; (2) building roads; (3) engaging in zoning activities; (4) presenting Glen Forest as a real estate business to prospective buyers, government bodies, and on their earlier tax
returns; and (5) making frequent and substantial sales of property. All of
these weighed against treating West Glen Estates as a capital asset under Winthrop. The Tax Court concluded that the Borees were engaged in
the business of developing and selling residential real estate, and therefore should have reported the income from the sale of West Glen Estates
as ordinary income. 25 Thereupon, the Tax Court found that the Borees
were liable for $1,784,242 in unpaid taxes arising from that mischaracterization. 26
The Tax Court also imposed the 20% penalty for understatement of
tax, pursuant to § 6662.27 That section of the Code imposes a penalty for
28
"[a]ny substantial understatement of income tax." However, the penalty
should not apply to any portion of the underpayment "if it is shown that
there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the taxpayer acted
29
in good faith with respect to such portion." "Reasonable cause" is determined "on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts
and circumstances." 30 If the taxpayer relies on the advice of a professional, that reliance must be reasonable and have been made in good
faith, 31 and the professional must have acted based on "all pertinent facts
and circumstances and the law as it relates to those facts and circumstances." 32 In applying the § 6662 penalty, the Tax Court did not provide
specific reasons for its determination that the Borees had not acted reasonably and in good faith. 33
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the Borees argued that the Tax
Court made various errors in its determination of the character of the
income from the West Glen Estates sale. First, the Borees contended that
the Tax Court erred in considering their intent in purchasing and holding
the West Glen Estates property over the years leading up to the sale in

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1099.
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) (2012).
I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012).
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (2014).
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (2014).
See Boree, 837 F.3d at 1093.
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2007. Rather, the Tax Court should have looked at the intent of the Borees in holding the property only at the time of the sale. 34 In support, the
Borees relied on the case of Sanders v. United States,35 which stated that
"it was the taxpayer's intent at the time of the sales that is relevant for
an inquiry as to whether capital gains treatment is justified." 36 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Borees' proposed analysis was nonsensical,
and cited another precedent, Suburban Realty Co. v. United States,37 for
the principal that "[a]t the very moment of sale, the property is certainly
being held 'for sale.' The appropriate question certainly must be the taxpayer's primary holding purpose at some point before he decided to make
the sale in dispute." 38 Further, the court noted that in Sanders, despite
the apparently favorable language, the court did look at the years preceding the taxpayer's sale of the property to determine the taxpayer's intent.39 Thus, the court determined that the Tax Court was correct in looking to the previous years in determining the Borees' intent with the West
Glen Estates property. 40
As for the Tax Court's analysis of the Borees' intent, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[t]here is no real dispute at this point that prior to the
enactment of the county land use restrictions, Glen Forest held the West
Glen Estates property for sale in the ordinary course of the business of
developing a subdivision."41 The court noted that sales of lots began immediately after the initial purchase, as did efforts to gain approval for
subdivision and development of the property. 42 The Borees held out West
Glen Estates as a subdivision development and took concrete steps to
make it such by creating roads, easements, and a homeowners' association. The Borees, however, pointed to the Baker County ordinance requiring the West Glen Estates roads to be paved as an "adverse government
action" that forced them to change their original intent with the property. 43 Although the court recognized that some government actions (such
as condemnation) can render an intent to develop the property unrealistic, it noted that in this case the government restrictions "merely placed
34. Id.
35. 740 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 889.
37. 615 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 182.
39. Boree, 837 F.3d at 1101. Boree explained that "the 'sales' the Sanders court referred
to . . . were the taxpayer's 'continuous and frequent sales of the lots"' over a several-year
period. Id. (quoting Sanders, 740 F.2d at 889).
40. Id. at 1101-02.
41. Id. at 1102.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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additional costs on developers interested in pursuing certain types of de44
velopment" and "did not foreclose all development." Moreover, even after the restrictions were imposed in 2004 and 2005, the Borees' actions
demonstrated a continuing intent to develop the property. Notably, the
Borees sought exemptions from the restrictions and hired a lawyer to
help get approval to rezone the property to permit denser development
45
(to fund the road paving costs). The court concluded that the actions

were "evidence of strategic and thorough involvement in pursuit of developing the property [and] indicates that the Borees were holding the property for sale in the ordinary course of business right up until they sold it
46
to Adrian and not merely as an investment property."
The Borees alternatively argued that the lots sold to Adrian had been
segregated from the lots that Glen Forest had sold over the previous
years. Thus, although the other lots had been sold in the ordinary course
of business, those sold to Adrian were an investment asset. As evidence,
the Borees noted that the sales agreement with Adrian described that
property as "unimproved" and .the portion sold to Adrian had not been
platted. The Tax Court had rejected this argument, noting for instance
that the maps and development plans the Borees submitted to the Baker
County Board of Commissioners did not segregate the properties in that
way, and the Eleventh Circuit found no fault in the Tax Court's conclusion. 47
Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court with respect to
the tax liability, it reversed on the matter of the penalty for understatement of tax.4 8 The court noted that the Tax Court had not given reasons
supporting its determination that the Borees lacked reasonable cause in
characterizing the income from the sale of West Glen Estates as longterm capital gain on their 2007 tax return or had not acted in good faith
in the preparation of their tax return. 49 In reversing the Tax Court on
this issue, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the record showed that the
Borees had no sophisticated knowledge of taxes and had long relied on
their accounting firm-a reputable firm headed by a professor of tax
law-to prepare their taxes.50 The Borees provided complete and accurate records to the firm, and the IRS conceded that the Borees did not

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1103.

at
at
at
at

1103-04.
1107.
1106-07.
1107.
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give any false information.51 The court concluded on this basis that
"[a]lthough the Borees' accountant prepared the 2007 tax return claiming
deductions of $46,360 for business expenses while claiming a capital gain
from the same activity, we find that it was reasonable for the Borees, who
were untrained in tax matters, to have relied in good faith on that decision." 52
II. Peterson v. Commissioner
The taxpayers in Peterson v. Commissioner53 were a married couple
(the Petersons). Mrs. Peterson, was a high-level sales executive, a National Sales Director, in Mary Kay, a large cosmetics company that relies
upon commission-compensated independent sellers. In that role, Peterson was no longer involved in direct sales to customers, but rather focused on incubating new sales organizations. For tax purposes, Peterson
was classified as an independent contractor, not as an employee. 54
As a National Sales Director, Peterson was entitled to participate in
two long-term compensation schemes: the Family Security Program (the
Family Program) and the Great Futures Program (the Futures Program).55 The Family Program functioned much like a conventional defined-benefit pension plan. Participating National Sales Directors were
entitled to receive a series of payments in the event of their death, disability, or qualifying retirement, based on their average commissions for
the five years preceding the triggering event. 56 The Futures Program was
a more narrowly tailored incentive program. Under this program, a National Sales Director that established sales organizations in designated
foreign countries was entitled to receive a specified percentage of the
commissions generated by those foreign sales organizations for a fixed
period after her retirement, death, or disability.5 7
Both the Family Program and the Futures Program included clauses
that permitted Mary Kay to unilaterally amend, modify, or terminate the
programs at any time.5 8 In 2008, Mary Kay did amend both programs to
respond to new section 409A,59 which imposes harsh penalties on de-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
827 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 970.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977-78.
Id. at 978-79.
I.R.C. § 409A (2012).
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ferred compensation arrangements that fail to satisfy certain requirements. The amendments provided that each program was "intended to
be a non-qualified deferred compensation arrangement" and that each
program was "intended to meet the requirements of § 409A . .. and shall
60
be construed and interpreted in accordance with such intent." A disclosure document provided to the taxpayer stated that the amendments
were intended to "make no substantive change" to the Programs, but rather to "simply clarify the language of the Programs to make it absolutely
6
clear that all provisions are in compliance with section 409A." 1 The disclosure explained the necessity for the amendments by noting that "[s]ection 409A is broad in its application" and that "it appears that these Programs likely fall within the broad definitions applied to section

409A . . .

"62

Peterson retired from Mary Kay in 2009 and received payments under
both programs in that year. The IRS asserted that under § 140163 these
64
payments were subject to self-employment tax. That section imposes a
tax on an individual's "self-employment income," which is defined as an
individual's net earnings derived from a non-employee trade or business
65
carried on by the taxpayer, subject to a number of exceptions. Courts
have held that self-employment income can derive from a trade or business carried on in a previous taxable year, but there must be "a nexus
between the income received and a trade or business that is, or was, actually carried on." 6 6 In the case of deferred compensation payments, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Milligan v. Commissioner6 7 stated the required nexus exists where the payments are
"tied to the quantity or quality of the taxpayer's prior labor, rather than
6
the mere fact that the taxpayer worked or works for the payor." 8 In that

case, the court concluded that post-retirement payments made to an independent contractor insurance agent were not self-employment income
where the payments were conditioned on a non-compete covenant and
were tied to the cancellation rate of policies written by him, as well as
69
the insurance company's income from those policies.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Peterson, 827 F.3d at 978-79.
Id. at 981.
Id.
I.R.C. § 1401 (2012).
Peterson, 827 F.3d at 981, 983.
I.R.C. §1401.
Newberry v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 441, 444 (1981).
38 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1099.
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With respect to the Petersons, the Tax Court concluded with relatively
little analysis that, within the meaning of § 1402,70 Mrs. Peterson's distributions from the Programs were "derived" from her self-employment
at Mary Kay 7' The court applied the Milligan court's interpretation of
the nexus standard for deferred compensation: whether the payments are
"'tied to' the quantity or quality of [the taxpayer's] prior labor." 72 The
court concluded that payments under both Programs were tied to the
quantity or quality of the taxpayer's prior labor. 73 In the case of the Family Program, payments keyed off of the prior commission levels attained
by the taxpayer. 74 In the case of the Futures Program, payments were
based on sales generated by the taxpayer's sales network, which the court
viewed as a measure of "how well the network performed based on her
prior services." 75
As a separate basis for its decision, the court noted that both Programs
referred to themselves as "deferred compensation" arrangements in the
2008 § 409A-related amendments.76 The court indicated that this characterization created a nexus between the payments under the Programs
and the taxpayer's prior self-employment and that the taxpayer had
failed to provide the necessary proof to disclaim this characterization under the restrictive rule from Commissioner v. Danielson,77 which limits
the ability of taxpayers to challenge their own contractual form. 78
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit gave
much greater prominence to the Danielson question. In Danielson, the
taxpayers were shareholders in a loan company. In connection with the
sale of the business, the taxpayers entered into a non-compete agreement
with the buyer. The purchase agreement governing the transaction set
forth a specific allocation of the consideration between the stock and the
non-compete agreement. Nevertheless, the taxpayers reported all of the
consideration they received as proceeds from the sale of stock giving rise
to capital gain.79 The court in Danielson refused to allow the taxpayer to
challenge the contractual allocation on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the substance of the transaction, holding that a taxpayer-

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

I.R.C. § 1402 (2012).
Peterson v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 619, 619 (2013).
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id.

76. Id.
77. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967).
78. Peterson, T.C.M. (CCH) at 621 (citing Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775 (en banc)).
79. Danielson, 378 F.2d at 773.
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initiated challenge to the form of a transaction is only permissible where
the taxpayer can bring "proof which in an action between the parties to
the agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or to show
its unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress,
etc."80 In addition to pointing to the inherent equity of permitting the
government to "hold a party to his agreement," the court identified two
important policy reasons supporting its rule.8 ' First, allowing challenges
to the tax treatment agreed to by the parties "would be in effect to grant,
at the instance of a party, a unilateral reformation of the contract with a
resulting unjust enrichment."8 2 Further, the absence of a rule against
taxpayer-initiated challenges would expose the government to the risk of
a "whipsaw," that is, inconsistent treatment of the different parties to a
transaction.8 3 Avoiding a whipsaw could require the government to pursue enforcement proceedings against multiple parties to ensure con8
sistency. 84 The Danielsonrule has been adopted in the Eleventh Circuit.
86
In the view of the majority, the Danielson issue resolved the case.
The taxpayer conceded that the 2008 amendments to the Programs explicitly described the payments as "deferred compensation," and no evidence was produced that would permit a deviation from the contractual
form under Danielson.87 Judge Rosenbaum, dissenting, argued that applying the Danielson rule in this context was far afield from its original
purpose and policy justifications.8 8 The dissent focused on the fact that
the taxpayer never agreed specifically to the characterization of payments under the Programs.89 Rather, this characterization was included
0
in a subsequent unilateral amendment made by Mary Kay.9 While this
amendment was concededly binding as a contractual matter, Judge Rosenbaum argued that, unlike in Danielson, the taxpayer was clearly not
initiating a "unilateral reformation" of the contract that could produce
unjust enrichment. 9 ' Rather, the taxpayer was a party to a contract that

80. Id. at 775.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Plante v. Commissioner, 168 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying
the Danielson rule).
86. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 987.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 994 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 996.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 997.
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had already been unilaterally reformed by Mary Kay. 92 In addition, the
dissent was not troubled by the idea that a failure to apply Danielson
could force the IRS to pursue litigation against both the taxpayer and
Mary Kay to protect its interests.93 In a case like this, Judge Rosenbaum
found there to be a "genuine dispute" on the merits. 94 Since the taxpayer
was "not attempting to pull a fast one on the IRS by backtracking on an
initial, mutual characterization," the dissent saw no reason to apply the
preclusive Danielson rule in favor of the IRS.96
Although it found the Danielson rule sufficient grounds to dispose of
the case, the majority also considered the merits.96 The taxpayer contended that payments under the Programs should be viewed, not as compensation but as payments for the sale of her Mary Kay business or payments for a non-compete agreement.97 The taxpayer also pointed to a
subsequently codified line of cases dealing with retirement payments to
insurance agents, many of which concluded that such payments were not
self-employment income.98 The majority dismissed both of these arguments.99 The Programs did not contain any evidence that the intended
transaction was the sale of a business, and the facts did not support the
conclusion that payments were intended to be for a non-compete agreement. 100 The court took the view that the insurance cases were distinguishable from the facts at hand on a number of grounds. 101
The dissent took a different approach. First, the dissent concluded
that, absent the Danielsonpresumption, the facts of the case did not support treating the payments under the Programs as "deferred compensation." 102 This conclusion was supported by the facts that the taxpayer was
not required to defer receipt of any income to participate in the program,
that the payments received by the taxpayer while she was employed were
adequate to fully compensate her, and that payments under the Programs were not vested since Mary Kay could terminate the Programs at
92. Id.
93. Id. at 998.
94. Id. at 999-1000.
95. Id. at 1000 n.6.
96. Id. at 989 (majority opinion).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 992-93.
99. Id. at 993-94.
100. Id. at 989-90. In fact, the taxpayer took a consulting position with a competitor firm
of Mary Kay. The company complained about the breach to the taxpayer and did not allow
her to participate in a cruise, but it did not take any other action (such as terminating
payments under the Programs). Id. at 982.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 996 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
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any time. 103 Having concluded that the payments were not deferred compensation, the dissent went on to examine whether they satisfied the
"nexus" test generally applicable under § 1402(a).1 04 The dissent concluded that the payments under the Family Program, which were a fixed
percentage of the taxpayer's annual commissions for a pre-retirement period, were tied to "the quantity or quality" of her prior labor, as required
by Milligan.05 On the other hand, the payments under the Futures Program were keyed off of the performance of sales units organized by the
taxpayer.106 The dissent concluded that these payments were not sufficiently related to the taxpayer's prior employment to constitute self-employment income.1 07
While the narrow technical issue regarding the application of the selfemployment tax to deferred compensation arrangements that was at issue in Peterson may be of limited interest, the court's expansive interpretation of the Danielson rule deserves attention. It is clear from the facts
that the 2004 amendments to the Programs were intended to ensure compliance with the new requirements of § 409A and were not thought of as
substantive changes. Moreover, the taxpayer was not involved in negotiating the amendments, was not required to consent to them, and may not
even have read them. Nevertheless, the court seized on a sentence in
those amendments referring to the Programs as non-qualified deferred
compensation arrangements (a defined term under § 409A) and forced
the taxpayer to accept that characterization for an entirely different purpose (computation of self-employment income under § 1402).10s
III. Dileng v. Commissioner
The United States is party to numerous bilateral tax treaties, which
have as their principal purpose the prevention of double taxation on those
persons who receive income that would otherwise be taxable by both
countries under their domestic tax laws. These treaties also typically contain information sharing and administrative assistance provisions to aid
in the collection of taxes. Article 27 of the United States tax treaty with

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1001.
1002.
1002-03.
1007-08.
1009.
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Denmark' 09 (the Treaty) is typical of these administrative assistance provisions and provides that the two states will "lend assistance to each
other in the collection of taxes" covered under the Treaty, upon the filing
of a "revenue claim" by the state requesting collection assistance. 110
When one of the two countries submits a revenue claim to the other, it
"shall include a certification by the competent authority of the applicant
State that, under the laws of that State, the revenue claim has been finally determined."111 The "revenue claim is finally determined when the
applicant State has the right under its internal law to collect the revenue
claim and all administrative and judicial rights of the taxpayer to restrain collection in the applicant State have lapsed or been exhausted." 112
Thus, when one of the contracting states conclusively determines under
its domestic tax laws that a taxpayer has an unpaid tax liability, it may
submit a revenue claim to the other state where the taxpayer or the taxpayer's property can be found, and that other state is bound to collect and
turn over that tax liability. What is less clear from Article 27 is what, if
any, rights a taxpayer has to challenge the execution of a revenue claim.
The case of Dileng v. Commissioner,113 decided in 2016 in the Northern
District of Georgia, provides a rare occasion in which the IRS's actions
taken pursuant to a revenue claim were challenged in court. The case
emphasizes that there are strict limitations imposed by United States
statutory law on a taxpayer's power to challenge a revenue claim.114
The Danish Ministry of Taxation, the Skatteministeriet, made a revenue claim to the United States with respect to Torben Dileng, a Danish
citizen residing in the United States, requesting assistance in collecting
approximately $2.5 million in unpaid taxes. The IRS subsequently informed Dileng that it intended to levy his U.S. assets to satisfy his Danish tax liability. In response, Dileng filed an action in Denmark to forbear
or postpone the collection of the tax, filed a Collection Appeal Request
with the IRS, petitioning the IRS to refrain from the levy until the Danish
action was resolved, and, upon denial of that request, filed a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
against the Commissioner of the IRS. Dileng's complaint requested a declaratory judgment and injunction to the effect that the IRS may not levy

109. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, with Protocol, U.S.-Den., Aug. 19, 1999, T.I.A.S. No.
13056 [hereinafter Treaty].
110. Id. art. 27(1).
111. Id. art. 27(2).
112. Id.
113. 157 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
114. See id. at 1338.

2017]

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

1055

his assets until the Danish courts make a final determination about his
tax liability. Because of his pending suit in Denmark, Dileng contended
that no final determination had been reached. 115
The United States took the position that Denmark had already
reached a final determination as required under Article 27 of the Treaty
and further contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
suit, due to the limits imposed by the Declaratory Judgment Act (the
DJA)116 and the Anti-Injunction Act 17 (the AIA).118 Under the DJA, "[i]n
a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 119 However, there are a few exceptions listed in the statute, including declaratory judgments sought "with respect to Federal taxes." 120 The AIA provides, with some exceptions not relevant here, that "no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed." 121 Under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),122 the United States moved for dismissal based
on the Treaty, the DJA, and the AIA.123
In resolving the United States' motion to dismiss, the court first looked
at two possible bases for its subject matter jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a) 124 and the Treaty itself. 125 Section 1346(a), the statutory basis
for tax refund suits, grants original jurisdiction to the district courts over
[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
126
manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.

115. Id. at 1339-40.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012).
117. I.R.C. § 7421 (2012).
118. Dileng, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1339.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
120. Id. An exception to this exception applies to declaratory judgments relating to nonprofit status under I.R.C. § 7428 (2012).
121. I.R.C. § 7421(a).
122. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1).
123. Dileng, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1340.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2012).
125. Dileng, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1340-42.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
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Under the Treaty, a "revenue claim shall be treated by the United
States as an assessment under United States laws against the taxpayer
as of the time the application is received." 127 Thus, if the revenue claim
is an assessment for United States tax purposes, there is some basis for
the position that § 1346(a) would provide jurisdiction for Dileng's suit.
The court explained, however, that the Treaty "does not provide that
a citizen of the applicant country against whom collection efforts for foreign taxes are directed is afforded all of the rights and challenge mechanisms that a citizen of the requested country might have to challenge the
assessed tax in the requested country."1 28 Rather, the court noted, "the
Treaty requires the requested country to accept that the taxes are due
upon certification by the applicant country." 129 The court therefore concluded that "[e]ven treating the accepted revenue claim from Denmark
as if it were an assessment of United States internal-revenue taxes, Section 1346(a)(1) does not apply[.]" 1 3 0

As an alternative to jurisdiction under § 1346(a), Dileng contended
that the court's subject matter jurisdiction arose from the Treaty itself. 131
There are two portions of Article 27 of the Treaty that the court found
relevant to its analysis. 132 Under Paragraph 2:
An application for assistance in the collection of a revenue claim shall
include a certification by the competent authority of the applicant
State that, under the laws of that State, the revenue claim has been
finally determined. For the purposes of this Article, a revenue claim is
finally determined when the applicant State has the right under its
internal law to collect the revenue claim and all administrative and
judicial rights of the taxpayer to restrain collection in the applicant
133
State have lapsed or been exhausted.

Paragraph 5, however, clarifies that Article 27 does not:
Creat[e] or provid[e] any rights of administrative or judicial review of
the applicant State's finally determined revenue claim by the requested State, based on any such rights that may be available under

the laws of either Contracting State. If, at any time pending execution
of a request for assistance under this Article, the applicant State loses

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Dileng, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1341 (quoting Treaty, art. 27(4)(a)).
Id. at 1341-42.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342-43.
Id.
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the right under its internal law to collect the revenue claim, the competent authority of the applicant State shall promptly withdraw the
request for assistance in collection. 134
From this, the court drew the conclusion that, "a revenue claim, if accepted, is treated by the United States as if it were an assessment of taxes
owed to the United States itself, subject to the laws of the United States
in collecting its own taxes, including the DJA and the AIA."135 Thus, for
the Treaty to provide jurisdiction for Dileng's action, those obstacles
would have to be overcome.
Dileng apparently did not raise any argument as to why the DJA
should not bar his request for a declaratory judgment, and the court disposed of that summarily.136 As for his request for an injunction, Dileng
argued, however, that two exceptions to the AIA applied to his case. 137
The first exception, created by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,138 allows a taxpayer to
challenge the collection of tax where "it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail" and "equity jurisdiction otherwise exists." 139 Dileng contended that because Denmark had
made no final determination prior to filing the revenue claim, the United
States had no authority under the Treaty to collect the Danish tax liability. 140 But the court rejected this argument, explaining that:
The exception allows a challenge to a tax assessment only where a
plaintiff can show that the United States will not prevail on the tax assessed. Plaintiff here does not challenge the underlying validity of the
Taxes in the United States, and does not assert . . . that there are no
circumstances under which he can be found liable for the Taxes in Den-

mark.141
That is, Dileng's action in Denmark was not about the validity of the
tax liability, but was rather a request to delay the collection of that liability. Even if he had challenged the validity of the tax in Denmark, he
had not alleged that there was no way that the Skatteministeriet would
have prevailed in that suit. Thus, the court concluded that Dileng had
not met the first requirement of Williams Packing, because he had not

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id.
Id.
370 U.S. 1 (1962).
Id. at 7.
Dileng, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
Id.
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alleged any facts that would support the notion that the assessment was
"without foundation."142

The court nonetheless continued its analysis, addressing Dileng's argument that his Danish tax liability was not "finally determined" for purposes of the Treaty.1 43 The court again pointed out that Dileng's suit in
Denmark was an action to forbear or postpone the collection of the tax
liability and was not a challenge to the validity of the tax. 144 Moreover,
under the Treaty, the authority to determine that a tax is "finally determined" was with Denmark, not the United States.1 45 Thus, the fact that
Denmark asserted that the liability was finally determined was sufficient
for purposes of the Treaty.
The second exception that Dileng raised to the AIA is based on the
Supreme Court's holding in South Carolinav. Regan.1 46 Regan provides
an exception to the AIA where "Congress has not provided the plaintiff
with an alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax." "7 Although this might seem to provide a more feasible approach for Dileng's
challenge, the court again noted, as it had in its discussion of Williams
Packing, that the Regan exception applies to challenges to the validity of
the tax, whereas Dileng's challenge was to the collection of the tax.1 48
Having disposed of Dileng's arguments in favor of the court's jurisdiction,
the court granted the United States' motion to dismiss.1 49
Dileng illustrates the difficulty facing a challenge to a revenue claim.
Prior to a levy to collect the foreign tax, the taxpayer faces considerable
obstacles under the Treaty (and similar tax treaties), the DJA, and the
AIA. It might seem that a taxpayer would have better luck waiting until
the property has been levied and then filing suit under § 1346 to recover
the property, thereby avoiding the limits imposed by the DJA and AIA.
At that point, however, the property may no longer be in the hands of the
United States, having been turned over to the country making the revenue claim. The taxpayer would then be, as Dileng was, in the position of
challenging the tax in Denmark or whatever foreign state filed the reve-

142. Id. (quoting Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 8).
143. Id. at 1345.
144. Id.
145. Id. ("nothing in Article 27 'shall be construed as creating or providing any rights of
administrative or judicial review of the applicant State's finally determined revenue claim
by the requested State, based on any such right that may be available under the laws of
either Contracting state."') (quoting Treaty, art. 27(5)).
146. 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
147. Id. at 373.
148. Dileng, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1348.
149. Id. at 1398.
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nue claim. That, of course, is likely the intended result under such administrative assistance provisions, as it keeps the United States courts
out of the job of adjudicating tax disputes between foreign states and
their taxpayers, even when those taxpayers may be residents in the
United States.
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